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Gen. Stanley McChrystal has turned up the heat on the White House, lobbying forcefully for more troops for Afghanistan and putting his commander in chief in a tough spot.
Now Washington is asking him to button it, raising questions about just how far the military should go in pressing its view.
On Monday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said civilian and military advisers should keep their advice private.
"In this process it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberation – civilian and military alike – provide our best advice to the president, candidly but privately," Mr. Gates said at a speech before an Army convention in Washington.
On Sunday, National Security Adviser James Jones told CNN's "State of the Union" that "it's better" for military advice to come up through the chain of command.
The administration is deep in an intense debate over the merits of sending as many as 40,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to halt deteriorating security. To some experts, the Obama administration's review is the right thing – having a robust internal debate before making a major decision. To others, President Obama is trying to have it both ways – encouraging the military to speak up when it suits his foreign policy objectives but quieting them when it doesn't.
"People are finding themselves wishing that generals were seen and not heard," says one retired senior officer.
www.csmonitor.com/2009/1006...-usmi.html
Some of us old-timers may remember Westmoreland's 1968 request for reinforcements, and how it was treated in Washington:
To meet the new enemy threat and regain the initiative, according to Wheeler, Westmoreland would need more men: "The add-on requested totals 206,756 spaces for a new proposed ceiling of 731,756."
It was a major turning point in the war. To deny the request was to concede that the United States could impose no military solution in the conflict, but to meet it would require a call-up of reserves and vastly increased expenditures. Rather than making an immediate decision, President Johnson asked Defense Secretary Clark Clifford to conduct a thorough, high-level review of U.S. policy in Vietnam.
A disgruntled staff member in the Johnson White House leaked the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal for additional troops. The story broke in the New York Times on March 10, 1968. With the images of the besieged U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the Tet Offensive still fresh in their minds, the press and the public immediately concluded that the extra troops must be needed because the U.S. and South Vietnamese had suffered a massive defeat.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk was subjected to 11 hours of hearings before a hostile Congress on March 11 and 12. A week later, 139 members of the House voted for a resolution that called for a complete review of Johnson's Vietnam policy. Discontent in Congress mirrored the general sentiment in the country. In March, a poll revealed that 78 percent of Americans expressed disapproval with Johnson's handling of the war.
On March 22, President Johnson scaled down Westmoreland's request and authorized 13,500 reinforcements. Shortly after, Johnson announced that Westmoreland would be brought home to be Army Chief of Staff. He was to be replaced by Gen. Creighton Abrams.
www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do
So where is last year's hero, Gen. Petraeus, on this? He is not being seen . . . some say he has political ambitions.
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05...litary.html
I am reminded also of Truman firing McArthur during the Korean War . . . McArthur had publicly called for attacking the Chinese mainland and demanded the use of nuclear weapons . . . but even that is eclipsed by Lincoln's dispute with McClellan, at a time when a military coup seemed a real possibility:
"I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can be dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aimed to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. "
www.authorama.com/life-of-a...ln-34.html
Now Washington is asking him to button it, raising questions about just how far the military should go in pressing its view.
On Monday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said civilian and military advisers should keep their advice private.
"In this process it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberation – civilian and military alike – provide our best advice to the president, candidly but privately," Mr. Gates said at a speech before an Army convention in Washington.
On Sunday, National Security Adviser James Jones told CNN's "State of the Union" that "it's better" for military advice to come up through the chain of command.
The administration is deep in an intense debate over the merits of sending as many as 40,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to halt deteriorating security. To some experts, the Obama administration's review is the right thing – having a robust internal debate before making a major decision. To others, President Obama is trying to have it both ways – encouraging the military to speak up when it suits his foreign policy objectives but quieting them when it doesn't.
"People are finding themselves wishing that generals were seen and not heard," says one retired senior officer.
www.csmonitor.com/2009/1006...-usmi.html
Some of us old-timers may remember Westmoreland's 1968 request for reinforcements, and how it was treated in Washington:
To meet the new enemy threat and regain the initiative, according to Wheeler, Westmoreland would need more men: "The add-on requested totals 206,756 spaces for a new proposed ceiling of 731,756."
It was a major turning point in the war. To deny the request was to concede that the United States could impose no military solution in the conflict, but to meet it would require a call-up of reserves and vastly increased expenditures. Rather than making an immediate decision, President Johnson asked Defense Secretary Clark Clifford to conduct a thorough, high-level review of U.S. policy in Vietnam.
A disgruntled staff member in the Johnson White House leaked the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal for additional troops. The story broke in the New York Times on March 10, 1968. With the images of the besieged U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the Tet Offensive still fresh in their minds, the press and the public immediately concluded that the extra troops must be needed because the U.S. and South Vietnamese had suffered a massive defeat.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk was subjected to 11 hours of hearings before a hostile Congress on March 11 and 12. A week later, 139 members of the House voted for a resolution that called for a complete review of Johnson's Vietnam policy. Discontent in Congress mirrored the general sentiment in the country. In March, a poll revealed that 78 percent of Americans expressed disapproval with Johnson's handling of the war.
On March 22, President Johnson scaled down Westmoreland's request and authorized 13,500 reinforcements. Shortly after, Johnson announced that Westmoreland would be brought home to be Army Chief of Staff. He was to be replaced by Gen. Creighton Abrams.
www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do
So where is last year's hero, Gen. Petraeus, on this? He is not being seen . . . some say he has political ambitions.
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05...litary.html
I am reminded also of Truman firing McArthur during the Korean War . . . McArthur had publicly called for attacking the Chinese mainland and demanded the use of nuclear weapons . . . but even that is eclipsed by Lincoln's dispute with McClellan, at a time when a military coup seemed a real possibility:
"I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can be dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aimed to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. "
www.authorama.com/life-of-a...ln-34.html
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